S
OCIOLOGISTS HAVE COINED the term recipe knowledge to describe the type of information transcribed and communicated in a step-by-step fashion with the goals of standardization and ease of repetition for any task (Shaffer, 1981) . The transformation of specialized knowledge into recipe knowledge has increased dramatically in many disciplines over the last several decades. Within the field of medicine, attempts have been made to standardize the diagnostic and treatment process via the creation of "recipes" that allow for a more homogenous medical experience. Called decision support systems in the medical field, these "recipes" vary in form from standard guidelines to computer-based aids to judgment. We contend that the creation of decision support systems in the field of medicine represents a deliberate construction of recipe knowledge. These two literatures have not been previously linked; however, we argue that medical decision support systems can be classified under the more general heading of recipe knowledge. With this unified notion, lessons from the recipe knowledge literature can be applied to issues surrounding decision support systems in medicine. Specifically, physicians express reluctance to use decision support systems in practice citing concerns about promoting "cookbook medicine". We hope to demonstrate that decision support systems, like other general forms of recipe knowledge, do not ultimately deskill the profession to which they are applied. In addition, we make the case that there are both appropriate and inappropriate uses of recipe knowledge and that an understanding of the boundary conditions of recipe knowledge can be used to inform the appropriate implementation of a decision support system within the field of medicine.
The Development and Use of Decision Support Systems
The last twenty years have witnessed a movement within the practice of medicine called EvidenceBased Medicine (EBM) that was intended to improve the quality of everyday medical practice through the harnessing of technology to assist physicians in assuring that their diagnoses and treatments were based on the best available scientific evidence (Timmermans & Mauck, 2005) . Motivated by studies that repeatedly documented widespread variation in the quality of medical CARE of various treatment populations (Havighurst, 1991) , EBM sought to bring some needed standardization to medical treatment through "the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients" (Timmermans & Mauck, 2005, p. 18) . The tools used to accomplish this standardization were the publishing of clinical practice guidelines and the development of more complex decision support systems, tools designed to inform a choice between two or more treatment options. Decision support systems include devices such as protocols and practice guidelines; for example, charts depicting appropriate dosage recommendations, or more opaque methods like computer based algorithms. The general category of decision support systems describes a set of methods that represent an attempt to standardize a specific process. Some decision support systems such as the Alvarado score can be deceptively simple. The Alvarado score is a "tally rule" (Alvarado, 1986) ; the decision maker   INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY, VOLUME 2, 2006 http://www. Technology-Journal.com, ISSN 1832-3669 simply adds one or two points for each symptom present that is consistent with appendicitis (the number of points has been previously determined). If a patient's overall "score" is less than 4, appendicitis is not considered a likely diagnosis. A score of 5 or 6 indicates that a patient's symptoms are consistent with appendicitis, a score of 7 or 8 indicates probable appendicitis, and a score of 9 or 10 indicates that appendicitis is very probable. On the other hand, some decision support systems can be complicated statistical functions. Regardless of the complexity of the diagnostic support system, the goal remains the same: reduce variability associated with judgment thereby improving clinical accuracy. Despite the lofty goal, physicians have been reluctant to embrace the EBM movement, and, as a result, decision support systems are grossly underutilized in practice (Rocha et al, 2001; Overhage, Tierney, & McDonald, 1996; Graham et al, 2001; Hilton & Simmons, 2001) . A striking example of this is demonstrated by Corey and Merentstein (1987) who developed a predictive instrument for acute ischemic heart disease which reduced the false-positive rate in diagnosis from 71% to 0%. During the test phase, all physicians were required to use the instrument. After the completion of the study, the instrument use was no longer mandatory but the tool was still readily available to physicians. However, the physicians only chose to use the instrument 2.8% of the time. At the present, decision support systems continue to be developed but their use still lags far behind. Berger and Luckmann (1966) coined the term recipe knowledge to refer to the "know how" people acquire that gives them pragmatic competence to accomplish the tasks of their jobs or their daily lives (Shaffer, 1981) . A recipe in a literal cookbook offers step-bystep directions in preparing the ingredients for each dish and for assembling and preparing the final form of that dish. Conceptually, therefore, recipe knowledge refers to the step-by-step directions people follow when learning how to do a new task or to operate a piece of technical equipment (Shaffer, 1981 . Functionally, all such procedural knowledge is alike in form irrespective of whether the content is technologically primitive or sophisticated. In any group, the common stock of knowledge can be likened to a cookbook, and the know how to accomplish any particular task can be likened to the individual entry in the cookbook, which is the recipe .
Recipe Knowledge as "Cookbook" Medicine
The mass publishing of cookbooks as a genre has popularized the goal of transmitting cooking instruction to cooks in the home without pursuing the goal of developing chefs in the process. Stated more formally, popular recipes are written to be followed by individuals without the need of developing the culinary skills of a chef. In an age of standardized ingredients, thermostatically controlled ovens, and electric timers, cooks need only the discipline to follow the recipes exactly in order to reliably produce a palatable dish. Popular cookbooks often omit any mention of the principles behind the inclusion of ingredients-such as baking soda, baking powder or yeast-on the grounds that cooks do not need, or want, to know why a dish "works."
The common thread running through this development of the technological transformation of the kitchen was the use of recipe knowledge as a way to deskill the process of cooking and to allow cooking operations to be performed by workers with little or any of the basic skills of cooking. The term "cookbook," then came to be a pejorative term for a manual that deskilled activities in a way that allowed workers to turn out increasingly sophisticated goods or services without developing any appreciable craft, skill or professional expertise.
We argue the development of decision support systems in diagnostic medicine represents a deliberate construction of recipe knowledge. Decision support systems have been designed with the same purpose as "recipes": standardization resulting in homogenization of experience/outcome. For this reason, physicians' often refer pejoratively to decision support systems as "cookbook medicine" (Timmerman & Mauck, 2005) . The term "cookbook medicine" refers to the concern that the following of algorithms, critical care plans, and practice guidelines in a context of managed health care will lead to a diminution of the quality of patient care (Gleiner, 1997; Harding, 1994) . The complaint about cookbook medicine represents a tacit recognition on the part of physicians that following published guidelines, and using the tools that have been developed to facilitate the implementation of these guidelines, has the potential to deskill the activities being carried out (Timmermans & Mauck, 2005) . The disdain for deskilled medical procedures is easily discerned in the following statement by Gleiner (1997) :
On the face of it, the cookbook approach seems to have little to commend it. To begin with, it implies that a clinician will throw away years of training and experience to stoop to a simpler and less sophisticated method of practice. Anyone can use a cookbook approach, so the logic goes, and therefore anyone can practice medicine using one. The value of training and experience would be greatly reduced if cookbook medical practice is adopted. (Gleiner, 1997, p. 14) While the deskilling of activities has been a common result (and often an explicit goal) of the development of recipe knowledge, there is evidence that knowledge workers of all types under the right circumstances can make use of recipe knowledge in their jobs in the service of acquiring and applying other skills (Shaffer, 2005) . Therefore, we argue that decision support systems play an important role in advancing medicine without "deskilling" the physician. To further justify this claim, we must explore the distinction between two types of recipe knowledge.
Medical Arts and Medical Science: Two Types of Recipe Knowledge
The cultural distinction between "art" and "science" can been applied to the practice of scientific medicine (Timmermans & Mauck, 2005) . The term "art" has been applied to the development and use of a craft, skill or expertise. Medicine as art emphasizes that physicians not only practice from the platform of their formal medical education, but that they also accumulate expertise with experience in treating patients that results in improved ability to diagnose and to treat those patients. The practice of medicine brings the development of clinical judgment as well as the skill to perform the required interventions. One feature of the belief in clinical judgment is the recognition that expertise involves tacit knowledge-"know how" that cannot be fully articulated (Polanyi, 1966; Schon, 1983) . In any art, a practitioner "knows what he or she is doing," but may not be able to articulate that know how to fully explain their judgments or to transmit their expertise to others. When it comes to education in the medical arts, recommendations for courses of treatment presented by textbooks and review articles offer medical students guidance that could be characterized as authors' personal, expert opinion (Woolf, 1995) . The test of expertise in the medical arts is pragmatic: more often than not, skilled physicians are able to determine what is wrong and to help their patients to get better. General statements of prescribed action and likely outcomes of that action in any field of endeavour might best be characterized as "rules of thumb;" (Schutz, 1964) in contemporary scientific medicine they are called guidelines and protocols (Dans, 1994) .
By way of contrast, the term "science" has been applied to those facets of medical practice that can be standardized and articulated sufficiently so as to be transmitted to others. To call some area of practice a "science" is to suggest that the proper procedures can be specified and developed into a routine that less experienced professionals-and even technicians-can be expected to reliably perform (Dans, 1994) . In the era of computer technology, the ability to standardize a practice sufficiently so that it can be accomplished by some type of technological application becomes the benchmark of progress. As Joseph (1987) suggests, "Science may be defined as knowledge which is understood well enough to be taught to a computer," (Joseph, 1987. p. 339) , and "…the process of going from an art to a science involves learning how to construct an algorithm" (Joseph, 1987. p. 339) .
The lessons of both medical arts and medical science, therefore, can be recognized as examples of recipe knowledge, but at two different levels of sophistication. Medicine as art corresponds to what has called simple recipes. The history of medicine, like the stock of everyday social knowledge, contains the distillation of what individuals have learned in the course of action and is stored and transmitted as habits or principles from what has "worked" in the past and what seems to be true in a typical situation. All such knowledge is incomplete and piecemeal: it lacks the consistency of scientific laws and applies best to the typical circumstances and relationships (Schutz, 1964) . Such collections of maxims and rules of thumb are worth preserving because they are literally better than nothing: they give us something to go on, they give us guidance for meeting the demands of the moment, and they give us a sense of what could reasonably be expected to occur as a result of our actions. But, these collections have obvious epistemological limitations. Their reliability is limited to the "typical" case, their validity has never been verified, and their prescriptions are neither certain to work nor even sufficiently measured to be characterized as probable to work, but are merely likely to work (Schutz, 1964; Timmermans & Mauck, 2005) . As Gleiner (1997) put it, the cookbook offers necessary, but not sufficient, information to succeed.
Medicine as science, on the other hand, represents what Shaffer (1998) called standardized recipes. As the previous quotations from Joseph (1987) suggest, explicit, step-by-step directions such as algorithms represent the ultimate goal of EBM. Where simple recipes offer only general guidance for a practitioner to follow and rely on the tacit knowledge of the practitioner to discover how to apply such general principles to specific cases, standardized recipes are sufficiently reliable to be followed verbatim in every relevant case-eliminating the need for the tacit knowledge of an experienced practitioner . In contrast to simple recipes, standardized recipes present themselves as sufficient bases for action. "If you follow the recipe, the outcome should be fairly predictable. This predictability of the outcome, after all, is the reason for having a recipe in the first place." (Gleiner, 1997, p.15) .
One of the most important differences between following simple recipes and following standardized recipes has to do with the discretion that is left to the practitioner. Because simple recipes constitute rules of thumb, practitioners are required to apply all of their experience and skill even to try to follow guidelines or protocols because these statements are not complete. In medicine, science often lacks the quality of evidence necessary to define optimal care with certainty for most conditions because of the limitations of the validity of available research, the small number of cases included in the data base, and the difficulty of evaluating expert opinion (Woolf, 1995) . Indeed, the language used to express such guidelines or protocols is required to be equivocal or vague in order to avoid overstating the certainty of the clinical outcomes to be obtained by following them (Timmermans & Mauck, 2005; Woolf, 1995) . On the other hand, standardized recipes promise predictable outcomes as long as the algorithm is followed precisely. We maintain that although the EBM movement is shifting the field towards standardization, the majority of medicine is still governed by simple recipes as opposed to standardized recipes. Therefore, physicians' reluctance to adopt "cookbook medicine" should be assuaged by the notion that there is still a vital role for expertise in the field of medicine.
Appropriate Uses of Recipe Knowledge
Decision support systems come in the form of both simple and standardized recipes. Although we generally contend that both types of recipe knowledge play a beneficial role in advancing the field of medicine, we argue that there are both appropriate and inappropriate ways to implement these decision support systems. We argue that there are two criteria for the appropriate application of decision support systems to medicine. First, decision support systems must be consistently applied, and, second, decision support systems should be used in conjunction with the care of a trained professional.
When decision support systems are applied consistently, their use results in several benefits. For example, decision support systems have been shown to decrease errors in decision making, foster the implementation of EBM, and reduce inappropriate admissions and costs (Balas, 2001; Sim et al., 2001; Pozen et al., 1980) . In addition, several studies have demonstrated increased accuracy in clinical judgment in a wide variety of settings with the use of decision support systems (Corey & Merenstein, 1987; de Dombel, Dallos, & McAdam, 1991; Ridderikhoff & van Herk, 1997) . Furthermore, decision support systems have been demonstrated to be more accurate than clinical judgment alone (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove et al., 2000; Grove & Meehl, 1996) .
Why are reliably applied decision support systems so effective? First, and most importantly, decision support systems force the practitioners to be consistent in their weighting of cues during each diagnostic task. Reliability is necessary for accuracy. Second, decision support systems have no memory constraints while the human mind has a limited capacity (Dans, 1994; Harding, 1994) . Physicians' memories for upto-date clinical information and best medical practices are limited. Consulting decision support systems, even the simplest protocols, can help prevent both errors of omission and commission. In general, humans have several flaws in their decision making processes. We tend to: ignore base rates, favor highly correlated predictors in decision making when uncorrelated predictors are optimal, fail to properly assess covariation among cues, assign nonoptimal and inconsistent weights to information, and overweight dramatic or vivid data (Dawes, 1979; Dawes, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; .
Inappropriate Uses of Decision Aids
We also make the case that there are inappropriate applications of recipe knowledge to clinical medicine. The first is the use of decision support systems on an "as needed" basis by physicians. Physicians may feel tempted to use un-aided judgment on cases that appear simple and reserve the decision support system for cases that are perceived to be more difficult. However, anything other than consistent, reliable use will decrease the utility of the decision support system. Given that the strength of the aid is primarily due to its standardization of the decision process, any attempt to de-standardize this process will defeat any advantage enjoyed by using the decision support system. Similarly, physicians' attempts to supplement the decision support system with additional information typically decrease accuracy. Physicians often desire to modify the outcome of the aid when they have information not included in the decision support system. Paul Meehl has referred to this information as "broken leg cues" (Meehl, 1954) . The concept describes data that, if known by the decision support system, would alter the recommendation of the aid. However, the problem is that rarely are such cues as informative or powerful as perceived by the physician. Consequently, physicians tend to regularly perceive information as "broken leg cues" when, in fact, "broken leg cues" rarely exist. Therefore, attempts to "improve" the accuracy of the decision support system by modifying the output of the aid with additional clinical knowledge actually result in decreased performance.
Second, we contend that the general trend towards self-care and self-diagnosis via the use of recipe knowledge represents a misapplication of decision support systems. One primary example of this trend is the "Doc-in-a-Box" software: medical computer software marketed to consumers seeking advice on their health. Docs-in-a-box software products include both information on a wide range of topics and interactive capabilities that provide references to ailments and injuries and offer wellness advice from nutrition to exercise (Tucker, 1996) . With the growth of the Internet, similar information can be found on line. Launched in 1998, Web MD, with its frequent advertising and catchy slogan "Health has a homepage", accomplishes much of what individually boxed CDRoms attempt (Sherrid, 1999) . However, the interactive qualities built into many of the on-line services and the software titles allow for abuse of the system of recipe knowledge originally created for use by medical professionals. Consumers may use Docs-ina-Box as alternatives to a physician's care and engage in self-diagnosis by following the software's prompts to input information about symptoms, and by taking the output list of one or more possible "identifications" of their condition as a reliable diagnosis of their presenting symptoms (Tucker, 1996) .
Conclusion
In the last twenty years the medical community has moved towards standardizing their diagnostic process via the Evidence Based Medicine (EBM) movement. This shift in philosophy has led to the development of decision support systems which were designed to assist physicians in the diagnostic process. As discussed, physicians have been highly resistant to the use of decision support systems in medicine. Physicians pejoratively refer to this movement of standardization as "cookbook medicine". Part of physicians' resistance to practice guidelines and to the use of algorithms has been the tacit recognition that the existence of these standards and tools has the potential to destroy the traditional social roles of physician (Dennett, 1986) . Dennett envisioned that the introduction of expert systems into the process of diagnosis, for example, would essentially limit the physician's role to gathering the information required by the system as input. Since an expert system is a computer program that models the skilled judgment of an expert (Leonard-Barton & Sviokla, 1988) , the treatment prescribed by the computer would be considered the best medical practice that could be provided for the patient, and the physician, in good conscience, could rarely justify making any other diagnosis or prescribing any other course of treatment. In Dennett's vision, the physician's independent exercise of clinical judgment would appear morally to be a dereliction of duty and legally to offer grounds for a malpractice suit. The deskilling of activities is a common result of the development of recipe knowledge. However, we argue that although decision support systems may deskill a specific aspect of clinical medicine, they enhance other aspects by freeing up the professional to acquire new knowledge or spend time with other aspects of the diagnostic process. Professionals of all types make use of recipe knowledge in their jobs in the process of acquiring and applying other skills (Shaffer, 2005) . Furthermore, there are vast areas of medicine in which decision support systems have not been developed. Science lacks the quality of evidence to define optimal care with certainty for most medical conditions. Therefore, it is likely that clinical judgment will continue to play an important role in many parts of medicine, and Dennett's vision is unlikely to be realized in the near future.
Some physicians, however, have embraced the concept of performance guidelines, and are even willing to accept the metaphor of a cookbook, for the sake of improving the quality of patient care. Gleiner (1997) , for example, makes the point that giving physicians' unbridled freedom in practice is not acceptable and that physicians should be held accountable for prescribing courses of treatment in accordance with the accumulated knowledge of best clinical practice. In Gleiner's view, clinical practice guidelines available in "cookbooks" supply an important ingredient for good medical practice-discipline! "Cookbooks" provide answers to the implicit question "What would the most knowledgeable doctor do in the situations we commonly face?" (Dans, 1994 (Dans, , p.1967 .
Another reason for some physicians to embrace the development of "cookbook" medicine was the promise that medical practice could be improved through management techniques such as Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) as systematic documentation of clinical outcomes is gathered (Harding, 1994) . As long as physicians recognize that guidelines in cookbooks are works in progress (Dans, 1994) and that these guidelines are subject to revision with the accumulation of additional evidence, cookbooks could facilitate the ideal of EBM by providing doctors up-to-date guidance as "what works in medicine and what does not" (Harding, 1994; p. 3) .
Our hope is that as the medical community becomes comfortable with the use of decision support systems, their use in clinical judgment will increase. However, we also want to caution against the inappropriate uses or abuses of these expert systems. We argue that the appropriate use of a decision support system centers on its consistent application by a trained professional. When decision support systems are used appropriately, they have increased accuracy in clinical judgment in a wide variety of settings (Corey & Merenstein, 1987; de Dombel, Dallos, & McAdam, 1991; Ridderikhoff & van Herk, 1997) . However, the inconsistent application of decision support systems, even by trained professionals, decreases the utility of the aid. In addition, an important component of these decision support systems is the expert; their knowledge is required to provide inputs, process the output, and prescribe an appropriate course of treatment. Use of "Docs-in-a-box" software and related websites by users who seek to avoid the care of a professional represents a potential abuse of decision support systems.
Decision support systems as recipe knowledge provide an important service to the medical profession: they improve accuracy in clinical diagnosis. However, when misapplied, decision support systems can inflate the confidence of practitioners who misuse them and result in the poor medical care of software users who attempt to self diagnose and self treat medical conditions.
